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Summary 
We report an empirical analysis of the responses of the supply and demand for 
secondary care to waiting list size and waiting times. Whereas previous empirical 
analyses have used data aggregated to area level, our analysis is novel in that it 
focuses on the supply responses of a single hospital and the demand responses of the 
GP practices it serves, and distinguishes between outpatient visits, inpatient 
admissions, daycase treatment and emergency admissions.  The results are plausible 
and in line with the theoretical model. For example: the demand from practices for 
outpatient visits is negatively affected by waiting times and distance to the hospital.  
Increases in waiting times and waiting lists lead to increases in supply; the supply of 
elective inpatient admissions is affected negatively by current emergency admissions 
and positively by lagged waiting list and waiting time. We use the empirical results to 
investigate the dynamic responses to one off policy measures to reduce waiting times 
and lists by increasing supply.  
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Although elective care in the National Health Service has been rationed by waiting 
time since the foundation of the NHS in 1948 there has been little econometric 
analysis of the way in which supply and demand respond to waiting times and waiting 
lists. This paper describes the results of an empirical analysis of the responses of 
inpatient, outpatient and emergency admissions to waiting list size and waiting times 
using data from a single hospital and the practices it serves.  
 
The first part of the analysis focuses on the hospital level supply of outpatient visits, 
inpatient admissions, daycase admissions and emergency admissions.  Since the 
theoretical models suggest that past behaviour and conditions influence future 
responses and outcomes, we utilize time series data at the hospital level to estimate 
supply responses to measures of current and past waiting times, list sizes and activity 
levels.  
 
The second part examines the demand side by modelling the outpatient referral rates 
of the GP practices served by the hospital and their response to outpatient waiting 
times. As the data are repeated time series observations at GP practice level, we have 
a panel dataset allowing us to estimate dynamic models controlling for unobserved, 
fixed, GP heterogeneity in referral rates.  
 
We then bring results from the two analyses together to perform simulations of the 
impact of temporary increases in activity levels resulting from one off policy 
initiatives. We increase the number of elective inpatient and day-case admissions 
exogenously by 10%, sustained for three months, and calculate the responses to the 
various waiting measures that subsequently feed back into activity levels. The paths 
of the waiting measures and activity levels is charted for 21 months after the 
exogenous increases in activity levels on the assumption that all responses remain as 
they were estimated from past behaviour. These give insights of how the system 
responds to various pressures, and how long it takes for it to be back at its original 





find that the system is back to its original levels by 21 months after the initial three 
months sustained 10% increases. 
 
There is a limited empirical literature on demand and supply response to waiting lists 
and waiting time. Martin and Smith (1999) estimated a supply and demand model 
using aggregate data on hospital utilization at a small area (ward) level in England for 
the years 1991 and 1992. The demand and supply equations are identified by 
exclusion restrictions and the models estimated by instrumental variables techniques. 
Gravelle, Smith and Xavier (2003) estimate demand and supply models using 
aggregate hospital utilization data at the more aggregated English Health Authority 
level for 24 quarters during the years 1987 to 1993. Whereas Martin and Smith (1999) 
only had one measure of hospital utilization, Gravelle, Smith and Xavier (2003) use 
separate additions and admissions measures for demand and supply respectively. Our 
study builds on this earlier econometric work in two respects. First, we model the 
admissions process in more detail by distinguishing amongst outpatient visits, 
inpatient admissions, day cases and emergency admissions. Second our data permit us 
to use the appropriate decision units when modeling demand and supply, namely 
general practices and the hospital.
i 
 
A related, non-econometric, literature, suggests that NHS waiting lists are subject to 
the power laws of complexity theory. Smethurst and Williams (2001) and 
Papadopoulos et al. (2001) argue that the NHS is self-regulating, and governed by 
complex feedback mechanisms. Our economic approach allows us to unravel these 
“black-box” relationships by modeling the feedbacks explicitly. By using the 
estimated system dynamics we can calculate responses to shocks to the system, as in 
Van Ackere and Smith (1999) and Smith and Van Ackere (2002). 
 
Section 2 sketches theoretical models of demand, supply, waiting time and waiting 
lists, which underpin the specification of the empirical models, and describes the data 
and methods. Section 3 presents the time series analysis of the models for supply, 
waiting times and waiting lists for the aggregate series of the hospital. Section 4 





visits rates at the hospital. These estimation results are combined in a simulation 
exercise as described above in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2  Modelling the market 
The setting for the paper is the Ayrshire and Arran Health Board (AAHB) in Scotland 
which covers a population of approximately 375,000 residents. The population is 
slightly older and more deprived than the Scottish average and has some of the 
highest unemployment rates in the UK (Arbuthnot, 1999). The population is spread 
across rural and urban areas, as well as two island communities. It is served by 61 
general practices and the Acute Trust largely provides care from two main District 
General Hospital sites, one of which is the focus of our study.  
2.1  Demand and supply 
The specification of the empirical models is guided by the line of theoretical models 
of the NHS which derive from Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984), especially Martin 
and Smith (1999), Gravelle, Sutton and Dusheiko (2002) and Gravelle, Smith and 
Xavier (2003). (See Cullis, Jones and Propper (2000) for a survey of the literature).  
The NHS has a list system with gatekeeping general practitioners: patients must join 
the list of a GP and the only access to NHS elective care is via a referral by their GP.   
 
Patients do not pay for NHS hospital care but they do have to wait significant lengths 
of time for elective care.  If a GP decides that a patient could benefit from elective 
care she refers the patient to see a specialist hospital consultant at a hospital outpatient 
clinic.  The patient will join the waiting list for outpatient appointments and will be 
seen by the consultant after a delay of some weeks (the median wait for outpatient 
appointments in our data is 31 days).  If the consultant decides that the patient should 
receive elective hospital care, the patient is then placed on the waiting list for elective 
admissions (either for day case treatment or for inpatient treatment) and will be 
treated after a further delay (the median time on the inpatient elective admissions 
waiting list in our data was 66 days).  Since patients must incur initial financial and 





outpatient appointment or the waiting time for admissions after being seen by the 
consultant will reduce the demand for elective care. Thus the demand function (
j
OVt D ) 
for outpatient visits by practice j at time t and the total number added to the outpatient 
waiting list (DOVt) are 
  ( ,, , )
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IAt w  and 
g
DAt w  are the waiting times for outpatient appointments (OV), 
elective inpatient admissions (IA) and daycase elective admissions (DA) perceived by 
general practitioners and patients at the date the patient consults the general 
practitioner. 
j
t z  is a vector of demand shifters which we discuss in more detail in 
Section 4 where we estimate practice level demand functions.  
 
The probability that a patient seen in the outpatient clinic is placed on the inpatient or 
daycase waiting list by the consultant depends on the waiting times for these types of 
elective care and the patient’s capacity to benefit from elective care. Hence the 
numbers added to the elective waiting lists in period t are  
( ,, )
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where the waiting times for day case and inpatient elective care (
h
kt w , k = IA, DA) are 
those forecast by the hospital consultant and the patient when the patient is seen in the 
outpatient department at period t.  
 
The hospital supplies four types of care: outpatient visits (OVt), elective inpatient 
admissions (IAt), elective day case admissions (DAt), and emergency inpatient 
admissions (EMIAt).  The waiting lists for outpatient visits, inpatient elective 
admissions and daycase elective admissions evolve as 
1 t tk t t k t WLk WLk D k δ − =+ − − ,       k = OV, IA, DA      (3) 
where the  kt δ  are the numbers of patients who leave these lists in the period because 
they die or move away or decide to get care in the private sector.    
 
We assume that the hospital decisions on emergency admissions and on the first three 





The utility function the emergency admissions decision maker is  
  1 11 1 ( ,, ,, ,;, )
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and for the elective care decision maker is 
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The hospital is an independent not for profit public sector trust which is obliged to 
break even taking one year with the next.  It has a block contract with the AAHB to 
treat AAHB patients under which its revenue does not vary with the number of cases 
treated within a range specified in the contract. The numbers of cases treated enter the 
utility functions because of their effects on hospital costs or because decision makers 
care about the well-being of patients.   
 
p






DAt w ) is a vector of the waiting time performance indicators for 
outpatient visits, elective inpatient and elective daycase admissions used by the NHS 
to reward the hospital. 
p
t WL  is an analogous vector of waiting list performance 
indicators. The specification of preferences allows for the possibility that rewards 
depend on the change in the performance indicator or a weighted average of current 
and past indicators. The hospital decision makers care about the hospital’s 
performance indicators because the NHS rewards good performance in ways which 
affect all decision makers, although the marginal utilities of particular managers from 
a given indicator may differ. For example, hospitals that perform well may be 
rewarded with preferential access to funds for capital investment or managers may 
have their salaries linked to the performance indicators.  More drastically, managers 
whose hospitals fail to achieve performance targets may be fired. 
 
We assume that the two hospital decision makers move sequentially with decisions on 
outpatient visits OVt, elective inpatient IAt and elective day case admissions DAt being 
taken after decisions on emergency admissions. This captures the plausible notion that 
emergencies have the first call on the hospital’s resources. As a consequence the 
elective decision maker’s choices of OVt, IAt, and DAt are conditional on EMIAt.  





Although there is an exogenous random demand for emergency care, the emergency 
admissions decision maker has some control over emergency admissions. For 
example, the thresholds for admitting certain types of emergency patients for 
observation can be varied as can lengths of stay. The emergency decision maker may 
or may not care about elective admissions and outpatient visits and may or may not 
take account of his choice of EMIAt  on the elective decision maker’s choice of 
outpatient visits and elective admissions.   
2.2 Data 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis of 
the supply and waiting list/times models. The monthly number of elective inpatient 
admissions (IA), elective day-case admission (DA) and emergency inpatient 
admissions (EMIA) are taken from the Scottish Health Data general acute 
inpatient/day-case record SMR01 dataset, which collects patient based data on 
inpatient and day-case episodes in general and acute wards. The length of stay for 
each episode is also recorded in this dataset, and the average length of stay (LOSM) is 
calculated as the average length of stay of all elective and emergency inpatient 
episodes during a calendar month. 
 
The number of monthly first outpatient visits (OV) is from the outpatient record 
dataset SMR00. This dataset collects patient based data on first attendance at 
outpatient clinics in all specialties (except A&E). 
 
The number of patients waiting for elective inpatient treatment (WLIA) or day-case 
treatment (WLDA) are from census data that record the number of patients waiting at a 
given point in time at regular intervals, in general the end of a quarter. The census 
also has information on the length of time patients on the list at the time of the census 
have been waiting. From this we have calculated the mean waiting time for those 
patients waiting for inpatient treatment (WTIM) and the median waiting time (WTI5), 
and the mean and median waiting times for those patients waiting for day-case 
treatment (WTDM and WTD5 respectively). These quarterly observations on waiting 





We have further constructed a variety of different waiting times variables to allow for 
the fact that the theoretical models are not specific about the precise form in which 
waiting time and waiting lists enter patient demand functions and decision-makers’ 
supply functions. The SMR01 records how long patients have been on the inpatient or 
day-case waiting list before being admitted. These are the realised waiting durations 
from the time of being put on the waiting list, in contrast to the census waiting times 
that refer to the stock of patient waiting at that point in time. We refer to the realised 
waits as durations in order to distinguish them from the census waiting times. As 
these durations are taken from the SMR01 record dataset, the averages (WDIM and 
WDDM for inpatient and day-case respectively) and medians (WDI5 and WDD5) are 
calculated from the monthly admissions. Combining the census waiting list 
information and the data on the number of admissions we have constructed the 
waiting times to clear the list for inpatient and day-case treatments as 
/ t t t WTTCI WLIA IA =  and  / t t t WTTCD WLDA DA =  respectively. 
 
The outpatient record dataset SMR00 contains information on how long patients have 
been waiting from making their initial appointment to their first outpatient visit. We 
have constructed the realised mean and median outpatient waiting durations (WDOM 
and WDO5). 
2.3 Estimation  of hospital model 
Referring back to the model sketched in section 2.1, we see that the decision makers’ 
choices of activity levels in period t will depend on the variables they perceive as 
exogenous at time t. The precise properties of these supply functions will depend on 
the utility functions and on whether the decision makers are myopic or allow for the 
effects of current decisions on future performance indicators. (See Gravelle, Smith 
and Xavier (2003) for a discussion and an example of some comparative statics in a 
similar but simpler model).   We do not specify precise forms for the waiting time 
variables in the demand functions for outpatient visits and additions to the elective 
lists, or in the utility functions but let these be determined by the data. For example, 
general practitioners could forecast elective inpatient waiting time by using the 





WDI5), or they could estimate waiting times as the time to clear the inpatient elective 
waiting list at last period’s output rate:  11 1 /
g
IAt t t t w WTTCI WLIA IA −− − == .   Or they 
may use weighted lagged sums of these measures.  Further, the periods defined by the 
administrative databases may not correspond to those in the demand and utility 
functions. Thus in general the reduced form supply functions will depend on lagged 
values of waiting times, waiting lists, and past supply decisions.  In the case of OVt, 
IAt, DAt we also allow for the possibility that current emergency admissions EMIAt 
enter the supply functions.  
 
In addition to the supply functions we also estimate equations for evolution of the 
waiting lists and for some of the waiting time measures.  Although the equation for 
the list size (3) is an accounting identity we do not have data on the additions to the 
list (Dkt ) or those dropping off the list (δkt).  Thus we estimate models of the form  
  () 1,, t tt t j WLIA f WLIA IA OV −− = .       ( 6 )  
for the inpatient waiting list and similarly for the day case waiting list. Data on the 
outpatient waiting list is not available.  
 
In all models, we allow for flexibility of the lag length with which explanatory 
variables enter the equation. We allow for all activity rates, waiting list/times, length 
of stay and bed availability variables to enter all models.  
 
Since patients can choose between the two hospitals in the Health Board the demand 
for outpatient visits at the hospital we study could depend on the waiting times and 
waiting lists at the other hospital. Hence decisions at the two hospitals could be 
interdependent in that a change in supply in one hospital will change its waiting times 
thereby changing demand at the other hospital and leading it to alter its supply 
decisions.  We assume that the decision makers in the hospital we study take the 
actions of decision makers in the other hospital as exogenous. Thus we allow for the 
possible effects of admissions, waiting lists and waiting times in the other hospital on 
the study hospital by including them as exogenous variables in the models for supply, 





in any of the models for the study hospital.   
 
The models were initially estimated by OLS. We found that transformation into 
natural logarithms of all variables resulted in the best model specification with respect 
to standard specification tests like the RESET test. Thus all estimated coefficients can 
be interpreted as elasticities. The variables to be included in the model were selected 
using a forward selection procedure. A full set of year and month indicators were 
originally included in the model to guard against spurious time series correlations of 
the various variables and to allow for exogenous shifts in preferences. The number of 
year and month indicators were then reduced in a final step by removing insignificant 
year/month effects in order to increase the number of degrees of freedom in the 
models. As the errors of the various models are likely to be contemporaneously 
correlated, we estimate the resulting equations jointly using the Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression Estimator (SURE) in a final step. 
 
3  Results for hospital supply 
Tables 2a and 2b present the final model specifications and the values of the estimated 
coefficients from the OLS and SURE estimation procedures respectively. The two 
estimation techniques result in very similar estimated coefficients and in the following 
we will discuss the specific values using the SURE results. 
 
Elective inpatient admissions (IA) vary negatively with day-case admissions in the 
previous month (elasticity -0.45) reflecting the substitution of day cases for inpatient 
elective admissions. We interpret this as the substitution of day cases for elective 
admissions. An increase in the number of emergency admissions in the current month 
decreases the number of elective inpatient admissions (elasticity -0.55), which 
supports our suggestion in section 2.1 that emergency admissions take priority over 
electives. The positive elasticity with respect to outpatient visits 3 months ago (0.21) 
shows that increases in demand lead directly to increases in supply. Supply also 
increases in response to increases in the lagged waiting time (elasticity 0.40) and the 





month effects, plus an indicator for an outlying observation in January 2000 (possibly 
due to policies introduced to counteract fears of computer system failure at the start of 
the millennium). The model estimated by OLS shows a high R
2 and passes the 
RESET test for misspecification. The Durbin-Watson (DW) test further indicates that 
there is no serial correlation problem in the residuals.  
 
The results for elective day-case admissions (DA) are qualitatively similar to those for 
elective inpatients. The negative elasticity (-0.16) with respect to elective inpatient 
admissions again suggests that inpatient admissions and day cases are substituted for 
each other to relieve workload pressure.  As with inpatient electives, increases in 
outpatient visits increase supply (elasticity 0.27). Both the inpatient median wait 
duration (elasticity 0.31) and the day-case mean wait (elasticity 0.13) increase supply. 
The main qualitative difference between elective inpatient and elective day cases is 
that emergency admissions have no direct effect on day-cases. This is plausible since 
an increase in emergency admissions will have more effect on the resources available 
for elective inpatient admissions than for day cases.  
 
In the model for the number of emergency inpatient admissions (EMIA) an increased 
number of patients on the elective inpatient waiting list in the previous month 
decreases the number of emergency admissions with an elasticity of –0.09. An 
increase in the realised elective inpatient median waiting durations in the previous 
month leads to an increase in the number of emergency admissions, the estimated 
elasticity being 0.04.  We interpret this as an indication that the hospital does have 
some control over its emergency admissions and it varies them to relieve pressure on 
elective admissions as shown by waiting list and waiting times for elective inpatients.  
 
There is strong serial correlation in the model for outpatient visits ( OV), with an 
apparent three months cycle. An increased number of outpatient visits three month 
ago is associated with an increase in the current period, whereas increases in the last 
and one-before-last months are associated with a decrease in the number of outpatient 
visits in the current month. The lag pattern may be explained by workload smoothing. 






The  elective inpatient waiting list ( WLIA) responds as expected to the one-month 
lagged waiting list (elasticity 0.78) and to the supply of elective inpatient admissions 
in the previous month (elasticity -0.17).  The list increases when outpatient visits 
increase as some of these lead to patients being placed on the list, the elasticity being 
0.09. Increases in day-case admissions, which are a substitute for inpatient elective 
admissions also reduce the list (elasticity -0.11).
ii 
 
In the model for the day-case waiting list ( WLDA) the elasticity with respect to 
outpatient visits in the previous month is again positive (0.31) and somewhat larger 
than for the inpatient waiting list. The waiting list again exhibits serial correlation 
though with two lags of the list affecting the current list. Unexpectedly, the number of 
day-case admissions does not enter the empirical model for the day-case waiting list. 
 
The four waiting time models are broadly similar. Three of the four waiting time 
measures (mean inpatient waiting time – WTIM;  mean day-case waiting time – 
WTDM; median outpatient waiting time duration – WDO5) exhibit positive serial 
correlation.  Waiting times are also correlated with lagged waiting list measures, with 
the day case waiting time measure (WTDM) varying with the lagged inpatient waiting 
list as well as the day case waiting list, possibly reflecting the substitutability of day-
cases and inpatient electives. Increases in supply reduce WTIM and WTDM.  
 
The limited number of other studies of the effects of waiting times on supply also find 
positive elasticities. Martin and Smith (1999) modeled supply responses for elective 
surgery using a 1991-2 cross section of 4985 wards with average populations of 
around 10,000. Using two stage least squares to allow for endogeneity of waiting 
times they found that supply (cases treated per head of ward population) was 
significantly positively related to the mean waiting time for patients from the ward 
(elasticity 2.93). In a more elaborate study which used a 6 year panel (1991/2-1997/8) 
of 5499 wards, and also disaggregated surgery into 7 broad specialities, Martin and 
Smith (2003) found that in 5 of the specialities supply was significantly positively 





negative but insignificant.  The elasticity of the supply of all specialities with respect 
to waiting time was 5.29. Gravelle, Smith and Xavier (2003) estimated a model for 
the supply of elective cases with a panel of 123 English Health Authorities over 24 
quarters (1987Q2-1993Q1). Elasticities with respect to the 1 quarter lagged mean 
waiting timer were much smaller than those of Martin and Smith (1999, 2003) 
ranging from 0.08 to 0.18. Our estimated elasticity of the supply of inpatient 
admissions with respect to the four month lag of mean waiting time is 0.40 and is 
therefore closer to those in Gravelle, Smith and Xavier (2003) than those of Martin 
and Smith (1999, 2003). Differences in estimation methods, units of analysis, setting, 
variable definitions and the timing of the studies make explanation of the differences 
in the estimates problematic but all have the same qualitative response of supply to 
waiting times.  
  
4  Outpatient Visits Rates – A Panel Data Analysis 
We next estimated models of demand by general practices for outpatient visits, some 
of which feed through into inpatient and day-case electives. The aim was to establish 
a demand response to waiting lists and/or waiting times at the hospital to complement 
the hospital supply models. We have available a panel of 61 GP practices with at most 
19 quarterly observations, for the period 1997q2-2001q4.
iii  
 
The empirical model for the outpatient first visit rate by GP practice j in period t is  
1
jt t s i jti j j jt
i
OVR WDOM x z v αβ γ η −
=
=+ + + + ∑∑ ￿￿
￿
    (7) 
OVR is the outpatient visit rate per patient practice and WDOM is the mean realised 
waiting duration for first outpatient visits at the hospital. The vector xjt contain “need” 
variables that include the age/sex profile of the GP patient population, the fraction of 
deaths of patients aged 0-64 at the practice level, and the standardised illness ratio, 
which is the all age/sex standardised proportion with a limiting long-term illness using 
1991 figures for the area where the GP practice is located.
iv The zj contain GP practice 
characteristics, including the distances to the study hospital and to the alternative 





whether he practice can perform minor surgery and the number of partners. We 
include year and quarter indicators in the model.  Given the large number of practices 
it seems safe to assume that each practice takes hospital waiting times as unaffected 
by its decisions on referral so that it is unlikely that there is any simultaneous equation 
bias affecting the estimates of the effects of waiting times.  
 
Table 3 presents a description of the variables used and their acronyms, together with 
some summary statistics. On average, just over 2% of GP patients have a first 
outpatient visit per quarter. 
 
Table 4 presents estimation results for the GP-practice level data. These results are 
from a simple OLS regression (weighted by the number of patients per GP practice) 
on the pooled data. We find a negative response of the outpatient visits rate with 
respect to the mean waiting duration for outpatient visits at the hospital. A 10% 
increase in the mean waiting duration 2 quarters ago leads to a decrease of 3.2% in the 
GP level outpatient visits rate.  
 
Inpatient and day-case waiting durations were also found to individually affect the 
OVR, as suggested by the theoretical model. However, none of the coefficients on the 
waiting variables were statistically significantly different from 0 when entered jointly, 
together with the mean outpatient visits waiting duration. The selection of the mean 
outpatient visits waiting duration provided the best fit to the data.  We also included 
the waiting times at the other hospital in the Health Board but found no significant 
effects on demand for the study hospital. 
 
There is no very clear pattern of demographic effects. With the fraction of the GP 
patient population aged 45-64 as reference point, the fractions aged 5-14 and 75-84 
are associated with less outpatient visits. A higher fraction of females is associated 
with more outpatient visits. GP practices closer to the hospital and further away from 
the alternative hospital have higher outpatient visits rates. Dispensing GP practices 
have less referrals. Both the local need indicators, the standardised all-ages limiting 





population aged 0-64 are found to have an expected positive association with the 
outpatient visit rate. 
 
As the mean outpatient waiting duration at the hospital is not correlated with the 
individual practice level characteristics, dropping these characteristics from the model 
does not alter the waiting duration elasticity much. Estimation of a model that 
excludes all variables except the outpatient waiting duration and time indicators 
results in an estimated elasticity of –0.30 with a standard error of 0.16. When we 
include practice specific fixed effects, the waiting duration elasticity estimate is –0.09 
with a standard error of 0.23; adding all the GP specific constants reduces the 
information available to estimate the waiting duration elasticity precisely. 
 
It is interesting to assess the habit persistence of GPs. This could be modelled as 
practice fixed effects, i.e. some practices always have higher outpatient visits rates 
than others, or as a dynamic process, a high outpatient visit rate in the past leads to a 
higher outpatient visit rate in the present (see also Goddard and Tavakoli (1998)). A 
combination of these two processes is likely to be the appropriate model. Table 5 
present OLS results of a dynamic model in the first column. The coefficient on the 
lagged outpatient visits rate is very high, 0.92, indicating that the GP outpatient visits 
rates are very persistent. This could be due to a mixture of habit persistence and 
unobserved GP practice characteristics. The results in the second column in Table 5 
are the estimates from a dynamic panel data model estimated by IV-GMM, using the 
so-called “level” moment conditions (see Blundell and Bond (1998)) with two 
instruments for the lagged referral rate, viz. the first and second lag of the differenced 
referral rates. These instruments are valid under certain circumstances in dynamic 
models with unobserved GP heterogeneity. The coefficient on the lagged outpatient 
visits rate is now much lower, 0.32, indicating that practice fixed behaviour dominates 
the persistence in the series. The (short-term) outpatient waiting duration elasticity is 
estimated as –0.32 in this IV model. The instrument validity is not rejected by the 
Sargan test, and the errors of the model in first differences display the proper MA(1) 
form. 





Although literature to date has examined the effect of waiting times on elective 
admissions and day-cases, rather than on the demand for outpatient visits, our 
estimated elasticities with respect to waiting time are not dissimilar. Papers which 
also examine practice level admission find elasticities of -0.25 for cataract surgery 
(Gravelle, Sutton and Dusheiko (2002) and -0.14 for all types of electives (Dusheiko 
et al, 2004). The somewhat higher elasticities in our models may reflect the possibility 
that the proportion of first outpatient visits which do not lead to elective care may be 
more responsive to waiting times than the more serious cases.  
 
5  Simulation of short term policy initiatives to reduce waiting 
In this section we present some simulations derived from the results of the hospital 
supply and the GP practice level demand results. Figure 1 charts the relationships and 
feedbacks between the various activity and waiting list/times variables found in the 
empirical analysis, including the GP outpatient visit rate response to outpatient 
waiting durations.  
 
As all estimated coefficients are elasticities, we can set some exogenous changes in 
percentage levels, and calculate the results in terms of changed waiting lists/times and 
activity levels, also in percentages, for the months following the exogenous changes. 
Thus we can examine the effects of a short term policy aimed at reducing lists by say 
paying consultants to work extra sessions leading to an increase in inpatient 
admissions over a fixed period.  We are interested in the changes in the future time 
paths of the endogenous variables (waiting times, waiting lists, supply) as the 
exogenous shock works its way through the system. 
 
We simulate the effects of a 3 months sustained 10% increase in both inpatient 
elective admissions and day-case admissions. During this period the direct feedbacks 
between elective inpatients admissions, day-case admissions and outpatient visits are 
set to zero, but they are allowed to develop in the months after. The simulation is 
based on the SURE results. The GP outpatient visits rate elasticity with respect to 





combining the estimation results in Tables 4 and 5. Figure 2 presents the monthly 
percentage changes in the various activity and waiting list/times series in the months 
after the initial 3 months of increased activity. The way to interpret these is that if for 
example the elective inpatient admissions are –2%, this means that activity levels are 
2% below what they would otherwise have been. 
 
The increased activity levels lead to a decrease in inpatient waiting list and inpatient, 
day-case and outpatient waiting times for the first 9-14 months. For the waiting 
durations, the largest relative effect is found for the mean day-case waiting time, 
which is almost 6% lower 3 months after the sustained increases in activity levels. 
The inpatient waiting list is about 6% lower than it would have been one month after 
the sustained increases. Because the model for day-case waiting lists does not contain 
the day-case activity levels, there is no decrease in the day-case waiting list. We will 
return to this issue below. Due to the decreased pressure on the system, there is a 
decrease in the number of inpatient and day-case admission for the first 8-11 months. 
Especially the number of elective inpatient admissions is almost 3.5% lower in 
months 6 and 7, whereas the number of day-case admissions decreases by around 1% 
in the months 4-11. After this period, waiting lists and times start to become higher 
than they otherwise would have been, and inpatient and day-case activity have a 
positive response to this. There is a slight increase in the number of outpatient visits, 
peaking in month 12 at 1%, and there is a slight initial increase in the number of 
emergency admissions. After about two years the system is almost back to its original 
levels. 
 
In Figure 3, we impose an elasticity of the day-case waiting list size with respect to 
the number of day-case admissions equal to that of the inpatient elasticity, -0.17. 
There now is of course a clear initial reduction in the day-case waiting list size, but 
this does not affect the results for the activity levels by much, as the day-case waiting 
list enters the model for activity levels only indirectly via the day-case waiting times. 






This paper has given a detailed account of time series analyses of empirical models 
for supply, waiting lists and waiting times at the hospital/specialty level for two 
hospitals in a Scottish region. A demand specification was also estimated using GP 
practice level information on the realised outpatient visits rate per GP practice over 
time. The results are generally consistent with the theoretical framework and the 
estimated elasticities have plausible values.   
 
The estimation results were combined to perform a simulation exercise to assess the 
responses to activity levels and waiting measures to exogenous increases in the 
number of elective inpatient and day-case admissions. The simulation exercise takes 
account of the dynamic relationships and feedbacks found between the various 
activity levels and waiting measures. The specific results from our study will not of 
course carry over to other hospitals and other areas. Especially where there is a 
greater density of population and hence of hospitals we would expect that there will 
be interactions between providers to be taken account of.  Nevertheless our analysis 
does show that it is possible to estimate economically sensible dynamic models of the 
supply and demand for hospital care.  It also carries the general lesson that that one-
off policy interventions to reduce waiting times have complicated effects which are 
difficult to predict a priori without a formal model  and which persist for a 
considerable time.    
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i Windmeijer and Hoonhout (2004) also estimated supply models for some specialties. 
ii The model for waiting lists as described in Section 2 is in the levels of the number of patients on the 
list and admitted and not in logs. Estimation of a model where the variables are not transformed into 
logs results in the same model specification. 
iii Using monthly data would result in too many zero outpatient visits rates. 
iv These variables were selected from various “need” indicators, including Arbuthnott indices, using 
standard model selection procedures. 
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 Table 3. Variable description and summary statistics of pooled data 
Variables Description  Mean  St.  Dev. 
      
OVR  Outpatient visits rate     .0228    .0173 
FRAGE01       Fraction of GP patients between 0 an 1 
years of age (x100) 
  1.8974    .4161 
FRAGE24       2-4    3.2802    .6778 
FRAGE514      5-14   12.5393   1.8933 
FRAGE1519     15-19    6.2160    .8439 
FRAGE2024     20-24    5.4411    .8963 
FRAGE2544     25-44   28.6507   2.9269 
FRAGE4564 45-64    25.1598   2.4548 
FRAGE6574     65-74    9.3303   2.2763 
FRAGE7584     75-84    5.6095   1.6348 
FRAGE85P      85+    1.8752    .8285 
FRFEMALE      Fraction of GP patients female   51.0354   2.2568 
DIST  Distance from GP practice to hospital 
(km) 
 19.1182  12.5393 
DIST_HOSP2  Distance from GP practice to 
alternative hospital (km)  
 20.8467  11.9634 
D_DISPEN      Indicator for dispensing GP practice     .0504    .2189 
D_MINORS      Indicator  for  GP  practice  performing 
minor surgery 
   .7212    .4485 
PARTNERS  Number of partners    4.0639   2.0897 
SIR91          Standardised Illness Ratio 1991  104.3237  25.0756 
FRDEATHS_064  Fraction of deaths, ages 0-64 * 100    .0682    .0476 
DFRDEATHS_064       Zero deaths ages 0-64     .1154    .3197 





Table 4. OLS results for GP level log outpatient visits rate 
Variables Coeff  Rob Se  t-ratio 
Dep. Var. LOVR     
      
LWDOM_2   -.3168  .1875   -1.69 
       
FRAGE01       -.1414  .1820   0.08 
FRAGE24       -.1416  .1335  -1.06 
FRAGE514      -.0250  .0863  -1.64 
FRAGE1519      .1305  .1144  -0.22 
FRAGE2024     -.0703  .1340   0.97 
FRAGE2544     -.1414  .0521  -1.35 
FRAGE4564  -  -  - 
FRAGE6574      .0005  .1196   0.00 
FRAGE7584     -.3196  .1055  -3.03 
FRAGE85P      -.0394  .1903  -0.21 
       
FRFEMALE      .0575  .0269  2.14 
       
LDIST  -.6992  .1136  -6.15 
LDIST_HOSP2   .5738  .0924   6.21 
D_DISPEN      -.9107  .3706  -2.46 
D_MINORS       .1948  .1617   1.20 
LPARTNERS  -.1882  .1311  -1.44 
LSIR91           .7290  .3084   2.36 
LFRDEATHS_064   .0782  .0340   2.30 
DFRDEATHS_064=0       .1631  .1149   1.42 
       
Y1997         -.1167  .0675  -1.73 
Y1998         -.0325  .0401  -0.81 
Y1999  -  -  - 
Y2000         -.0223  .0288  -0.77 
Y2001          .0674  .0523   1.29 
Q1           -  -  - 
Q2  -.0197  .0133  -1.48 
Q3            -.0182  .0158  -1.16 
Q4            -.0133  .0169  -0.79 
   
#OBS 997 
#GP practices  61 
Time period  1997q4-2001q4 
R2 0.73 
RESET  161, p-value 0.00 
 
Notes: The prefix L indicates a logarithmic transformation of the variable. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and general correlation over time 
of the residuals by GP practice 
 





Table 5. OLS and GMM results for GP level log outpatient visits rate, dynamic model 
    OLS              IV Level 
Variables Coeff  Rob Se  Coeff  Rob Se 
Dep. Var. LOVR         
         
LOVR_1  .9247  .0294  .3274  .0570 
LWDOM_2  -.3693  .2043  -.3209  .1656 
         
#OBS 996  935 
#GP practices  61  61 
Time period  1997q4-2001q4  1998q1-2001q4 
R2  0.96  Sargan p, 0.50 
RESET  10.70, 0.00  p-Ar1, 0.00, p-Ar2, 0.69 
 
Notes: Other variables included as in Table 4. 
IV estimation results obtained with the Stata routine XTABOND2. 
Instruments used are () 1 2 tt LOVR LOVR −− −  and () 2 3 tt LOVR LOVR −− −  










































Figure 1.  Flowchart of relationships in the empirical models.  
2
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
2
.
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
n
 
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
a
n
d
 
w
a
i
t
i
n
g
 
l
i
s
t
s
/
t
i
m
e
s
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
a
n
 
e
x
o
g
e
n
o
u
s
 
3
 
m
o
n
t
h
 
1
0
%
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
i
n
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
d
a
y
 
c
a
s
e
 
a
d
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
3
.
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
n
 
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
a
n
d
 
w
a
i
t
i
n
g
 
l
i
s
t
s
/
t
i
m
e
s
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
a
n
 
e
x
o
g
e
n
o
u
s
 
3
 
m
o
n
t
h
 
1
0
%
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
i
n
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
d
a
y
 
c
a
s
e
 
a
d
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
,
 
i
m
p
o
s
i
n
g
 
e
l
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
d
a
y
-
c
a
s
e
 
w
a
i
t
i
n
g
 
l
i
s
t
s
 
w
r
t
 
t
o
 
d
a
y
-
c
a
s
e
 
a
d
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
s
 
f
o
r
 
i
n
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
 
w
a
i
t
i
n
g
 
l
i
s
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
a
d
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
.
 
 
-
1
0
-
8
-
6
-
4
-
2
0
2
4
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
1
4
1
6
1
8
2
0
2
2
2
4
W
T
I
M
W
T
D
M
W
D
O
5
-
7
-
6
-
5
-
4
-
3
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
3
4
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
1
4
1
6
1
8
2
0
2
2
2
4
W
L
I
W
L
D
-
4
-
3
.
5
-
3
-
2
.
5
-
2
-
1
.
5
-
1
-
0
.
5
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
1
4
1
6
1
8
2
0
2
2
2
4
I
A
D
A
E
M
I
A
O
V
-
7
-
6
-
5
-
4
-
3
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
1
4
1
6
1
8
2
0
2
2
2
4
W
T
I
M
W
T
D
M
W
D
O
5
-
7
-
6
-
5
-
4
-
3
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
1
4
1
6
1
8
2
0
2
2
2
4
W
L
I
W
L
D
-
4
-
3
.
5
-
3
-
2
.
5
-
2
-
1
.
5
-
1
-
0
.
5
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
1
4
1
6
1
8
2
0
2
2
2
4
I
A
D
A
E
M
I
A
O
V